THREE CORE TAKEAWAYS (XX-PJ)Edit
WHY THE JAPANESE FAILURE TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND?Edit
- They squandered the two years leading up to 1945.
- Interservice rivalry led to a lack of coord to defend the homeland--worse than in the US.
- Japanese psyche was a collectivist culture; essentially counting loss of homeland as a potential cost (pg 252b).
WHY WOULD THE JAPANESE PERSIST IN A LOSING WAR?Edit
- Culture answer: defeat is the same as dying (257) thus victory or defeat was not about dying—dying didn’t matter even if according to Onishi we are talking about 20M Japanese. Dying is better than loosing “to glorify our national and military traditions” as one staffer put it.
WHAT WAS THE MEANING OF LEMAY'S AIR CAMPAIGN?Edit
- LeMay's leadership had its own effect (p 259-261).
- BL: the impact of strategic bombing is condition setting (p 261).
- Lessons in targeting: fire bombing is argued (in Whirlwind) as effective (p 262-263).
DEFINTION OF STRATEGISTS (258).Edit
Strategists are essentially policy makers, and those who set policy for the air campaign over Japan resided in Washington D.C. [opposing view could be, no, military strategists are design advisors and politicians the policy makers].
ALTERNATIVES TO THE BOMB (p. 265)?Edit
a. Declare victory and leave. Incompatible with the end of 'unconditional surrender.' No.
b. Naval siege continued. More innocent civilian deaths than nukes. No.
c. Invade. D-Day 2? Unacceptable means… especially one year after Normandy. No.
d. Then, and only then, after running those COAs can one understand the nuclear option in context.
Question: between fire bombing and nukes were their negotiations? Potsdam Declarations.
The question of "equivalency" of nukes is discussed on pgs 267, 268, 271.